The Public Funds Investment Institute (PFII), which tracks LGIPs, or local government investment pools, recently posted a news story titled, "How to (Ab)use AI In Investing." Marty Margolis explains, "Here's a bright -- but bad -- idea for how to use artificial intelligence to boost your investment results. It illustrates the potential and the peril that we face as AI infuses our lives. Let's say you are the treasurer of a city in Texas that has eight competing LGIPs. Or California where there are five. It would be straight forward to commission an AI agent to keep track of your pool balance, check the yield on each fund every morning and move all funds to the one that posted the highest yield. Like magic, no human intervention and you could expect to pick up a few basis points of yield. If the pool portals you use would not permit an AI agent to move money, you could assign an entry level human employee to implement the AI agent instructions. It might take 10 minutes a day, almost as efficient as having the AI agent do it all. Pretty simple, right? Well, this is both a dumb idea and a bad one."
He continues, "It's dumb because for the vast majority of stable value LGIP portfolios 'yield' is a backward-looking number representing the income an investor would have received over the prior seven days. No doubt there are LGIP investors who spend time yield-shopping, but moving money for a few basis points of 'yield' is dumb. That's not to say yield should be ignored. If you compare fund yields or compare them to a benchmark like a PFII LGIP Index, an S&P LGIP index of rated LGIPs or a Crane Data index of money market funds over a period of time -- say six months -- you may identify consistent differences and it's important to understand why. It's the 'why' that should go into your investment decision process."
Margolis writes, "Much of the concern about AI focuses on whether it will displace human work or amplify the efforts of hackers, but there is another relevant aspect: its potential to disrupt and destabilize financial markets in ways that we are only beginning to comprehend. LGIPs are in the business of intermediating funds, just as money market funds and banks are. Stable value LGIPs convert cash which is immediately available for use to short-term securities that mature in 30 days 90 days or even one year. The LGIP then collects the difference in the time value of money that it pays to shareholders. This intermediation creates a mismatch of liquidity and maturity, and it works as long as the LGIP investors don't all rush for the exists or flood a fund with money at the same time. The problem is that an AI agent can accelerate the movement of money to the point where it is destabilizing."
He states, "The prudent manager of an LGIP will evaluate past investor behavior, study cash flows, and keep enough funds liquid so that even an unlikely event -- say a big move in rates -- will not exhaust its liquidity. The prudent manager may discourage hot money investors to dump large amounts into the fund to take unfair advantage of rates. But investor inertia is also a factor that affects fund flows. Some investors are quick to respond to market signals while others are not. And investors react to the signals differently, so a change in market rates might motivate one to move immediately while another decides to wait for further information or even to prioritize something other than moving funds now."
The piece continues, "It's possible to imagine that AI-driven investing designed to chase a basis point or two could result in swings in LGIP balances of 20% or 30% or more in a day. That would amplify fund asset volatility, force a fund’s manager to adopt a radically different investment strategy, and reduce the benefit that funds are able to provide investors. From this perspective AI-driven investment is a bad idea."
Finally, it adds, "That's not the only reason major banks have blocked AI agents from interacting directly with them. They worry about AI agents that successfully hack an account and impersonate the real owner, AI agents that hallucinate, and AI agents that simply do the wrong thing. Bottom line: Maybe a frontal assault by AI agents will not happen, but for all the potential of AI there are risks, some known and some that we will understand only after they've inflicted something bad. The challenge for public funds investors -- indeed for all of us no matter what our roles -- is to consider the risks of this emerging technology before we apply it."
For more on AI and Cash Sweeps, see our recent Crane Data News stories: "SMBC's Abate Asks, 'Will AI Wake Up Cash?' Going Mobile for High Yields?" (11/13/26), "Investment News: Schwab Blocking AI" (10/30/26), "NBER Paper on Institutional Money Funds with AI 'When Cash Wakes Up'" (10/29/26), "Schwab Comments on Sweeps, Cash, AI on Q3'26 Call; Wells, BlackRock" (10/19/26), "JP Morgan Chase Q3 Earnings Call Discusses AI Agents and Cash, Deposits" (10/14/26), "WSJ Discusses AI's Impact on Brokerage Sweeps and Bank Cash Sorting" (9/29/26), "Money Funds Low Profile on Q2 Earnings Call Radar; Schwab, Northern" (7/23/26), "Barron's Writes Again on Sweeps and AI; Crane 100 MF Index Up to 3.44%" (6/2/26), "LPL Sees No AI Risk of Cash Sorting" (5/4/26), "Raymond James Call Responds to 'Agentic AI Cash Sweep Optimization'" (4/24/26), "Barron's on Schwab AI Sweeps Worries" (4/21/26), "Earnings: JP Morgan Talks AI Cash Allocation Tool; BNY on Tokenization" (4/20/26), "Schwab Says AI a Tailwind, Not a Threat to Cash Sweeps on Q1 Update" (4/17) and "Morgan Stanley Q1 Call: AI & Sweeps" (4/16).
In other news, the Federal Reserve published a "Financial Stability Report" for November 2026, which includes "a summary of the developments in the four broad categories of vulnerabilities since the May 2026 Financial Stability Report." They tell us, "Funding risks have remained moderate.... Banks' reliance on uninsured deposits -- an important component of their funding risk -- was well below the peaks in 2022 in the aggregate, and fewer banks were as heavily reliant on such funding as they had been during that period."
The report says, "Assets in cash-management vehicles remained at record levels, primarily reflecting assets in government MMFs, which have historically proved the least susceptible to large-scale investor redemptions among these vehicles. Runnable instruments as a share of GDP edged higher over the first half of 2026, and instruments susceptible to liquidity disruptions remained roughly stable as a share of total runnable instruments. The total market value of stablecoins stayed at around $310 billion over the past year."
The Fed piece tells us, "As of July 2026, total MMF assets remained at a record high of around $7.9 trillion, as MMF yields continued to be more attractive than those of most bank deposits.... The largest share of these assets was held in government funds, which are less susceptible to runs because they only hold short-term U.S. government and agency securities as well as repos backed by these securities. Institutional prime MMF assets accounted for about 3 percent of total MMF assets and stood at 22 percent below their February 2020 pre-pandemic level. Despite their relatively small size, institutional prime MMFs remain the most vulnerable segment of the industry and runs by their investors could trigger broader funding market disruptions."
It continues, "Other cash-management vehicles, including dollar-denominated offshore MMFs and short-term investment funds, also invest in money market instruments and engage in liquidity transformation. Estimated aggregate assets under management for these vehicles stood at $2.3 trillion as of the second quarter of 2026, with their share of GDP up 60 basis points from a year earlier. Many of these vehicles have portfolios similar to prime MMFs. Their exact size is difficult to gauge owing to data gaps, and estimates range from $1 trillion to $2 trillion."
The Fed update adds, "The market capitalization of stablecoins -- digital assets designed to maintain a stable value relative to a national currency or another reference asset -- remained relatively flat at around $310 billion over the past year amid lower crypto-asset prices. The market continues to be concentrated among the two largest issuers."