A recent acedemic paper, "Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy: the Role of Non-​Bank Financial Institutions," written by Gara Afonso, Marco Cipriani, and Gabriele La Spada, explains, "Using a quasi-​natural experiment, we show that quantitative easing (​QE) interacts with bank regulation, impacting the size and portfolio choices of non-​banks. In 2021, upon the expiration of the Supplementary Leverage Ratio relief, banks were incentivized to reduce leverage, shedding deposits and reducing the supply of wholesale debt. We show that as a result, money-​market funds experienced large inflows and shifted their portfolios toward the Federal Reserve'​s ONRRP facility. Our results imply that when non-​banks can access the central-​bank balance sheet, they end up holding a share of central-​bank liabilities, draining reserves and affecting the impact of QE through banks. In this paper, we use a quasi-​natural experiment to show that quantitative easing (​QE) interacts with bank regulation and, by increasing banks' balance-​sheet costs, impacts both the size and portfolio choices of non-​bank financial institutions." They tell us, "​After the Global Financial Crisis (​GFC), the Federal Reserve grew its balance sheet sharply to stimulate the economy through QE, increasing bank reserves, deposits, and lever age. Concurrently, US regulators implemented several reforms that penalize banks' balance sheet expansions; the goal of these regulations is to reduce bank risk-​taking by curbing bank leverage. The most notable example of these rules is the Supplementary Leverage Ratio (​SLR), which sets an explicit limit on the amount of leverage that large banks can take. This regulatory constraint makes balance-​sheet expansions more costly …